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was at least the illusion (and often the reality) that the government could substantially control the flow of
images within its borders. With transformations in television systems, national systems of broadcast regulation
have declined, replaced by transnational flows of information where local gatekeepers are not so salient. The
rise of satellites with regional footprints and the spread of the Internet give governments the ability to reach
over the heads of the state and speak directly to populations. Both receiving and sending states will have
foreign policies about the meaning of the right to receive and impart information and the extent to which
satellite signals can be regulated or channeled.
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End of TV and Foreign Policy  
 
Abstract: The transformation of television has altered the capacity of the state to control 
the agenda for making war, convening peace and otherwise exercising its foreign policy 
options.  As broadcasters become more abundant, more diverse, and more partisan, the 
locus and substance of debate on global issues shifts.  
 
In the age of the state gatekeeper, there was at least the illusion (and often the reality) that 
the government could substantially control the flow of images within its borders.  No 
foreign government’s policy could reach local audiences in a massive and effective way. 
 With transformations in television systems, national systems of broadcast regulation 
have declined, replaced by transnational flows of information where local gatekeepers are 
not so salient.   
 
The rise of satellites with regional footprints and the spread of the Internet gives 
governments the ability to reach over the heads of the state directly and speak directly to 
populations.  Both receiving and sending states will have foreign policies about the 
meaning of the right to receive and impart information and the extent to which satellite 
signals can be regulated or channeled.  This process may have limits that are not yet well 
understood. 
 
Bio: Monroe E. Price is Director of the Center for Global Communication Studies 
(CGCS) at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania and 
Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University. Price 
also serves as Director of the Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy Research in 
London and Chair of the Center for Media and Communication Studies at the Central 
European University in Budapest. He served as dean of Cardozo School of Law from 
1982 to 1991. Among his many books are a treatise on cable television, Media and 
Sovereignty and Television, the Public Sphere and National Identity. 
 
Is there a specific kind of foreign policy that should be (more or less) identified with the 
classic era in broadcast television?  If such a media-influenced foreign policy existed, has 
its content and approach been modified or altered because of transformations in 
communications technologies and distribution systems?  There are two salient aspects, at 
least, when thinking about foreign policy and the media.  The first is whether modern 
technological developments mean that foreign policy is increasingly affected by media 
concerns.  The second is whether there is what might be called a foreign policy of media 
structures, namely an interest by one state (or the international community) in the mode 
by which media is developed through an interdependent set of nations.  The answer to 
both questions is yes, and the issues are interconnected. 
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Think of the Cold War—or elements of it—mapped against the 1950s and 1960s 
structure of radio and television broadcasting.  A claim might be that the Cold War was 
only possible in a period of (almost) hermetically sealed borders in which there were 
strong and centralized spheres of influence.  In this telling, the effectiveness of the Berlin 
Wall depended on the very conditions that yielded to the increased information 
permeability of borders by media, the images of freedom projected through trans-border 
media.  International broadcasting (the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty and the BBC World Service among others), relying on short-wave facilities, had 
helped to crack information monopolies, but the dam broke with the rise of satellite and 
the increase in spillover broadcasts from neighboring states.  In parallel, one might argue, 
the system of scarce broadcasting with heavy licensing or state-connected public 
broadcasting systems in Western Europe and the United States allowed for the 
reinforcement of a national consensus against the Soviet threat.  
A second, more general, claim, easier to substantiate, would be that any intelligent  
foreign policy,  involved in relations with publics abroad (and maintaining support at 
home) would have a necessary relationship with changing structures of the media.i   
National identities—and interactions among states—are consequences, in part, of media 
and communications systems.  The concept of an effective national identity, associated 
with a state, presupposes a kind of information system that produces it.  And that 
information system may have, as part of its composition, narratives about the place of the 
state in the world.  As information systems alter, indeed alter substantially, it might be 
assumed that there are knock-on effects for national identities and for the states with 
which such identities are politically central.  Television is only a small part of an 
information system or set of systems that are used to produce national identities.  But 
even so, reorganizations in the mode of making, distributing and controlling television 
images yield consequences for those fashioning attitudes towards the greater world.   
To understand how the “end of television” in its classic sense may have 
implications for diplomacy and public diplomacy, a few initial words about these terms 
are in order.  The historic element of foreign policy is the diplomatic interaction among 
officials of two or more states; “public diplomacy” seeks to bypass the state and reach 
directly to audiences.  How the balance between the two has changed with altered 
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television technology is implicated in the “CNN effect.”  The term was first used during 
the Gulf War of 1990.  With the rise of CNN and its 24-hour style of reporting, it was 
argued, leaders learned more from television than from their own officials about what 
was going on in the battlefield (and in the diplomatic sphere).  Leaders could conduct 
diplomacy in real time, and in the fishbowl of a global news service they could directly 
reach past official and autocratic gatekeepers to broad civil publics.  Steven Livingston 
has listed three potential shifts because of this phenomenon:  media as a) an enhanced 
agenda setter (where the media trump the agenda-setting effort of the government; b) an 
impediment to policy-making (where the existence of the media effect narrows or 
forecloses options open to the government; and c) an accelerant to policy decision-
making (where the impact of media coverage forces the government to take an action it 
might otherwise not have been inclined to (Livingston 1998).   
The case most often cited for the “CNN effect” is 1992-1993 in Somalia.   
Graphic pictures of starving children led to the humanitarian effort of President George 
Bush who sent in American military; almost a year later, similarly graphic pictures of a 
gang desecrating the body of an American and dragging it through the streets led 
President Bill Clinton to announce that the United States would be leaving Somalia.  
Television brought the Americans in and television forced the Americans out. 
There has been much controversy over the extent of the CNN effect and its 
transformation of the diplomatic sphere.  Several conclusions can be drawn.  First, most 
of those who seek to shape multiple foreign policies or react to them have internalized the 
phenomenon of global news services and have adjusted their behavior.  What was most 
striking about the supposed impact of media in the early 1990s was the novelty of the 
new opportunities it presented.  Like militaries seeking to cope with new weaponry, 
diplomats had to adjust to an altered media world.  Once they had done so, once they 
could more consciously calibrate the consequence of various appearances on global news 
services, the transformative impact of the new technology was lessened.  Second, the 
impact of the changes have now extended far beyond CNN: Al Jazeera and multiple other 
broadcasters are now competing for the attention of international publics, and the 
resulting impact that this reach could have on foreign policy.  While the internalization of 
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the changed media environment works toward reducing the CNN effect, the continued 
expansion of global broadcasters works toward increasing it.   
The CNN phenomenon tended to locate the broadcaster as the independent 
variable, and the leaders, governments and publics as the dependent variables.  We now 
see a broader interplay among leaders, governments and publics than was identified in 
connection with the CNN effect, but the examination of a foreign policy of the media 
sphere demonstrates how almost all aspects are interdependent.  James Hoge has argued 
that the impact of the media is greatest when there is a humanitarian crisis and there is an 
effort to mobilize a domestic community to press its officials to take action (Hoge 1994).  
Hoge sees a special impact as well where a broadcast shows, to a government’s domestic 
audience, a sustained set of images that, through its tragic and dramatic force, undermines 
the narrative of success that officials have proclaimed.  Here such a broadcast narrative 
can impede or accelerate government action or it can alter the agenda.  The issue can be 
put differently.  The ubiquity of media and their capacity to provide unfiltered access to 
harsh global events increases emotional impact (and an emotional impact not constructed 
or controlled by the government or its gatekeepers).  This is not to say that foreign policy 
has always been based entirely on reason and conducted in an environment wholly 
immunized from public opinion.  But, at certain times, and subject to the varying skills of 
international players, media can foreshorten time for reflection and raise spectacularly the 
way the stakes are perceived and governments are measured.   
 
 As significant, perhaps, is the impact that changed broadcasting technology and 
structure have had on public diplomacy.  There are elements of the conduct of foreign 
policy where public opinion plays little if any role.  But the proportion of foreign policy 
initiatives that involve influencing the public (so as to influence leaders) seems to have 
increased.  There is a new imperative for reaching out to publics, changing hearts and 
minds, and engaging in soft power.  New technologies enable and, as a result of 
competition, virtually require that states have a strategy to deal with foreign audiences 
(Dizard 2004).  
For decades, states have invested in persistent and large-scale “international 
broadcasting” efforts to subsidize radio (and later television) that would alter the flow of 
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ideas in a target society.  The Voice of America and Deutsche Welle emerged during 
World War II; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the BBC World Service were 
established during the Cold War.  But the process of developing government-subsidized 
efforts for radio and television that reaches a global audience has altered greatly with 
technological and political change.   
The strongest of these international services, like the U.S.-funded Voice of 
America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (established as “surrogate radios” in the Cold 
War, ostensibly to provide information-deprived populations with access to news and 
information about their own society) and the BBC World Service, financed by the UK’s 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, had extensive ambitions that were tied to foreign 
policy goals (sometimes only the goal of greater access to information, but sometimes 
more).  In the early 21st century, the U.S. foreign policy question was which of these 
services to maintain and at what level; put differently, whether given scarce resources, 
international broadcasting efforts to reach, inform and persuade should be redirected from 
the former Soviet Union towards target publics elsewhere, such as the Middle East.  
Subsidy on a large scale is used to determine what languages, what technologies 
and what groups to persuade.  In the 1990s, Serbia invested in a satellite service to reach 
its diaspora and gain moral and financial support for its position; Hungary, after its 
transition, created Duna TV to reach ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania (Romania).  In 
1996, Qatar, in a novel use of funds, established Al Jazeera and altered the media face of 
the Middle East.  Other governments in the region, including Saudi Arabia, saw to it that 
their satellite presence was bolstered.  Western governments, seeking to reach the “hearts 
and minds” of Arabic youth across borders, have responded in kind: the BBC, France 24, 
Deutsche Welle and Russia TV today have launched or expanded their Arabic-language 
television offerings, and the United States limps along with al Hurra, its entry into the 
competition among Arabic satellite channels for the privilege of defining “news” and 
presenting a stronger image of the United States (Heil 2007). Even independent satellite 
services are tied to government-related interests.  Beginning with the post-Soviet 
transition, Western nations have subsidized (or invested in) the development of an 
indigenous media in transitioning societies as part of the process of democratization.  
Without being too reductionist, the United States has emphasized the development of 
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“free and independent media” as an integral part of this process, while the UK has 
preferred to focus on strengthening public service broadcasters.  In some transitional 
contexts, this odd Great Powers contestation has led to temporary stalemates.  It is not 
clear that there is a formula that works.  
Shifts in broadcasting technologies and distribution systems have had limited 
impact on these elements of foreign policy, the foreign policy of broadcasting structures 
and the transformations of international broadcasting.  Undoubtedly, institutions like the 
BBC World Service and the Voice of America will change substantially because of the 
Internet and satellite, but the existing relationships, the confidence in the existing method 
of reaching audiences, and institutional inertia has meant less change than might have 
been expected.  For some target societies, the “end of tv” in the classic sense of 
broadcasting has not yet occurred.  
  
There is yet another way to look at the structure of broadcasting and foreign 
policy: through the lens of the global debate over information flows and development.   
The 1970s and 1980s involved competing policies (with the United States often in 
opposition to many other states) over the proper information system to support political, 
economic and social growth. Notions of “modernization” (Lerner 1958; McClelland 
1961; Rogers 1962; Schramm 1964) competed as a basis for policy debates with ideas of 
eliminating “dependence” (emphasizing decolonialization and liberation) (Baran 1957; 
Dos Santos 1970; Frank 1969; Galtung 1971). Anthony Giddens (1990) argued for the 
important role that media culture plays in the development of world markets, the 
cohesion of the nation-state, the perception of military blocs and the capacity to 
industrialize. 
 In this global debate, “the free flow of information” became an aspect of foreign 
policy for some countries in the West, particularly the United States.  As Ulla Carlsson 
has written, the concept of the free flow of information captured U.S. attitudes after 
World War II.  Under the U.S. position, national frontiers should not be allowed to hinder 
the flow of information between countries. Prior to World War II, the media and 
entertainment corporations in the United States had only limited access to media markets 
in the extensive territories under the control of colonial powers such as Great Britain .  
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After the War, “The U.S. saw before them a world without colonial ties, a world that lay 
open for an expansive economy in the U.S. The information sector was a key factor in 
paving the way for economic expansion” (Carlsson 2003, 6).   
 In the 1970s, advocates of “free flow” found increasing resistance at UNESCO 
and the United Nations Assembly, especially from non-aligned and developing countries 
that had a very different set of starting points in terms of shaping their own national 
identities in the fresh era of independence.  A report from a UN symposium at the time 
noted:  
Since information in the world shows a disequilibrium favouring some and 
ignoring others, it is the duty of non-aligned countries and other developing 
countries to change this situation and obtain the de-colonization of information 
and initiate a new international order in information (Carlsson 2003, 11)   
 
All of this set the stage for the appointment of the International Commission for the 
Study of Communication Problems, known as the MacBride Commission, following the 
1976 UNESCO General Conference.  It is impossible to summarize adequately the 
findings and the consequent debate over the MacBride Commission, but it encapsulated a 
“foreign policy” of media structuring.  For the Commission, Cees Hamelink defined a 
new international information order as an international exchange of information in which 
states develop their cultural system in an autonomous way, have sovereign control of 
resources and fully and effectively participate as independent members of the 
international community (Hamelink 1979).  The MacBride Commission and the 
proceedings following its submission became a lightning rod for voices in the United 
States, Great Britain and elsewhere that sought to implement global processes that 
reflected the principles of free flow of information.  So sharp was the discord over these 
questions, so committed was U.S. foreign policy, that the government withdrew from 
UNESCO, not returning for 19 years until 2003. 
 
The End of TV is marked by the decline of state control over information space. 
As that occurs, voluntary negotiations among states (or between states and media 
conglomerates) concerning the flow of certain categories of information (for example, 
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hate speech, pornography and information related to national security)  increase—as do 
new means for states to reinstate their authority.  Historically, states have had a tacit 
agreement that the media of one state would not persistently permeate the boundaries of 
another.  The International Telecommunication Union was, in a sense, created to help 
police the allocation of spectrum so that, for the most part, radio (and then television) 
signals would be contained within national boundaries.  Short-wave efforts designed at 
first to reach subjects around a colonial world were an exception to this general rule. 
While there were accepted and less accepted violations of the general principle, it was 
only with the arrival of the satellite (and to a lesser extent cable) that the general 
understanding disintegrated.  And even then, there were attempts (at the UN and 
elsewhere) to transfer to the satellite regime the state-protective elements of terrestrial 
radio and television. 
The 1982 UN resolution concerning direct television broadcasting sought to 
encourage consultation between broadcasting states and receiving states (UN General 
Assembly 1982).  The Television Without Frontiers Directive of 1989 (and the 
subsequent revisions of 1997 and 2007), governing members of the European Union, is 
an example of a more successful operative effort to establish a regime that mediates 
information crossing the relevant boundaries. Article 22 requires bilateral consultations 
where a member state hosts programs that significantly impair the moral development of 
children in a receiving member state, thus imposing a limit (though only an extremely 
narrow one) on the circumstances in which one member state can allow signals to flow, 
without objection, into the territory of another (Crauford Smith 1997).  
In addition to bilateral and multilateral negotiations between states, there are other 
unofficial (and often much less transparent) forms of negotiation among states and 
between states and broadcasting entities or distributors to limit or affect the impact of 
transborder information flow.   
This hidden “foreign policy” of the media reflects changes in media technologies.  
New competitors are much more dependent on agreements with states or with gatekeeper 
broadcast entities within states than is realized.  Domestic structures are the pillars upon 
which global media systems are built.  The television signals of CNN or BBC do not 
simply waft through the air, encountering no controllable gatekeeper before they invade 
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the collective local consciousness.  Today, to understand the actions of News Corporation 
or MTV, or the competition between CNN and BBC World, we must look at the 
domestic structures in the receiving countries, structures upon which dependence often 
still exists.  We must see how shifts in those pillars are used to temper the entry of the 
global players.  Indeed, “law,” in the sense of officially-developed norms that control 
behavior, may be less often the result of unilaterally declared statue or regulation than of 
negotiation. 
These negotiations take place in the midst of two transitions: the transformation of 
scope and scale among the producers of channel services and programming who seek to 
distribute signals transnationally, and the transformation of the structure of receiving 
mechanisms that exist as gatekeepers and filters within every country.  For music video 
channels to gain entry into certain markets, or to gain shelf space on cable or in a bouquet 
of channels carried by a direct-to-home provider, the channel must negotiate the program 
content with the provider. There is usually no explicit legal standard at the base of such 
negotiations: channels may promise that they will confine themselves to entertainment 
and not carry news, not as a result of formal law but as an informal condition for entry.  
Another example are negotiations between international broadcasters and local 
transmission facilities. Formal or informal arrangements between states and large-scale 
international news organizations will become more frequent, implicating contractual ties 
with governments to operate terrestrial transmitters, to broadcast via the national system, 
or merely to gather information.   Increasingly, states seek to regulate who has access to 
transponders or uplink facilities.   
There are an increasing number of such negotiations to protect information space. 
Some of the most well-known examples are between the receiving state and the large 
multinational private broadcasting firms.  In 1995, India agreed, in an arrangement that 
soon fell apart, to permit CNN to broadcast on a favored Doordarshan frequency if CNN 
agreed that the Indian broadcasting host would provide most of the news about its own 
domestic affairs (Page and Crawley 2001).  China agreed to more extensive entry for 
Star-TV but, in apparent exchange, Star-TV’s parent, News Corporation, agreed that the 
BBC would not be carried.  It is extremely likely that MTV, the popular global music 
television service, negotiates to ensure that it is cognizant of and, to the necessary extent, 
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abides by local custom and preference in its choice of music, music videos, and hosts.  
More confident post-Soviet Republics negotiated with Russia to admit Russian language 
programming under approved circumstances.  Similarly, a meeting of information 
ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) served, even before the war in 
Afghanistan, as the arena to mediate disputes between Qatar, the home of outspoken 
satellite broadcaster Al-Jazeera, and the government of Bahrain, which considered Al-
Jazeera’s broadcasts deleterious and violative of the public order (BBC 1999). 
Other efforts have focused not on the broadcaster itself but on the distribution 
channel. One example is the story of MED-TV, the satellite service established in 1994 in 
the UK, which targeted Kurdish populations worldwide, but particularly in Turkey, Iran 
and Iraq.  Turkey contended that MED-TV was a “political organization” that supported 
the PKK, widely characterized as a terrorist organization, and attempted to suppress 
MED-TV unilaterally by policing the purchase and mounting of satellite dishes within 
Turkey’s borders.  Failing at this, Turkey was required to employ a bilateral strategy to 
stifle the MED-TV channel: officials mounted a campaign to pressure the British 
government to withdraw MED-TV’s license and sought, in other European capitals, to 
deny MED-TV leasing rights on government-controlled transponders on Eutelsat.   
 
International human rights norms, such as Article 19 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which outlines the right to receive and impart information, can be said 
to be part of an international “foreign policy” of media structures.  States have utilized 
Article 19 to press for a greater range of domestic voices, especially in societies that are 
thought to be authoritarian or oppressive of domestic minorities.  The general 
proscription against hate speech and bilateral agreements to adjust media use in the 
interest of peace is another example.  In the ill-fated Oslo Accords, part of the Middle 
East Peace Process, there were mutual undertakings by Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority to seek a media sphere that was more conducive to sustained amity.  
Increasingly, regional efforts, such as the Arab Satellite Broadcasting Charter adopted in 
February 2008, try (often in vain) to control the implications of new technologies for 
multilateral relations.   The power of images will create novel ways, in the future, for 
foreign policy goals and the uses of media to intertwine. 
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Conclusion 
 From the perspective of foreign policies, there are implications of transformations 
in television systems.  The major change is the seeming decline of national systems of 
broadcast regulation and the rise of transnational flows of information where local 
gatekeepers are not so salient.  In the age of the state gatekeeper, there was at least the 
illusion (and often more) that the government could substantially control the flow of 
images within its borders.  No foreign government’s policy could reach local audiences in 
a massive and effective way.  States could play with this system around the edges, 
through international broadcasting, cultural exchanges and other devices.  But the system 
was maintained, almost by common understanding among the powers.   
 The rise of satellites with regional footprints, the forest of dishes in major cities 
where diasporic groups live and the spread of the Internet and Internet cafes gives 
governments the ability, if they are clever enough (which few may actually be) to reach 
over the heads of the state directly and speak directly to populations.  This process may 
have limits that are not yet well understood, as states intent on control regulate the use of 
dishes or the carriage of signals on transponders.  States will have foreign policies about 
the meaning of the right to receive and impart information and the extent to which 
satellite signals can be regulated or channeled.   
 Finally, the transformation of television has—at least to the extent the CNN 
Effect is alive—altered the capacity of the state to control the agenda for making war, 
convening peace and otherwise exercising its foreign policy options.  As broadcasters 
become more abundant, more diverse, and more partisan, the locus and substance of 
debate on global issues shifts. Oddly, states may opt for greater commercialization to 
counter this danger of lack of control or seek other means to restore systems to the status 
quo ante.  
 
 
 
Works Cited 
 
Baran, Paul A. 1957. The political economy of growth. New York: Monthly Review 
Press. 
M. Price 
 
 12
 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 1999. GCC information ministers voice concern at 
activities of Al-Jazeera TV.  Oct. 15, 1999. Source: Al-Ra’y, Amman, in Arabic (Oct. 10, 
1999). Al-Jazeera has also generated complaints from Algerian, Moroccan, Saudi 
Arabian, Kuwaiti, and Egyptian governments. 
 
Carlsson, Ulla. 2003. The Rise and Fall of NWICO – and Then? Paper presented at 
EURICOM Colloquium on Information Society: Visions and Governance, Month.  
Available at http://www.bfsf.it/wsis/cosa%20dietro%20al%20nuovo%20ordine.pdf 
 
Craufurd Smith, Rachel. 1997. Broadcasting Law and Fundamental Rights.  Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Dizard, Jr., W. 2004. Inventing public diplomacy: the story of the U.S. Information 
Agency. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Dos Santos, Theotonio. 1970. The structure of dependence. American Economic Review 
60:2: 231-6. 
 
Frank, Andre G. 1969. Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
 
Galtung, Johan. 1971. Members of two worlds; a development study of three villages in 
western Sicily.  New York, Columbia University Press. 
 
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The consequences of modernity. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Hamelink, C. 1979. The new international economic order and the new international 
information order. Paris, UNESCO: Mauve Paper 34, International Commission for the 
Study of Communication Problems. 
 
Heil, Jr., Alan L. 2007. Rate of Arabic language TV start-ups shows no sign of abating. 
Arab Media and Society. Available at http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=180  
 
Hoge, Jr., James F. 1994. Media Pervasiveness. Foreign Affairs 73 (4): 136-144. 
Lerner, Daniel. 1958. The passing of traditional society: modernizing the Middle East. 
New York: Free Press. 
 
Livingston, Steven. 1997. Beyond the “CNN Effect:” the media-foreign policy dynamic. 
In Politics and the press: the news media and their influences, edited by P. Norris, 291-
318.  Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
McClelland, David. 1961. The achieving society. Princeton, NJ, Van Nostrand 
 
Nye, Joseph S. 2004. Soft power: the means to success in world politics. New York: 
Public Affairs.  
M. Price 
 
 13
 
Page, David and Crawley, William. 2001, Satellites over South Asia: broadcasting, 
culture, and the public interest. New Delhi: Sage Publications.  
 
Rogers, Everett M. 1962. Diffusion of innovations. New York: Free Press. 
 
Schramm, Wilber. 1964. Mass media and national development. California: Stanford 
University. 
 
UN General Assembly Resolution. 1982. Principles Governing the Use by States of 
Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting. A/RES/37/92. 
Adopted at 100th plenary meeting, Dec. 10, 1982. Available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r092.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 David Mellor “Silence is Golden for Murdoch,” The Guardian, Apr. 1, 1994. 
                                                 
i For a general introduction, see Nye 2004.  
